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Abstract. Automated negotiation systems are becoming increasingly important
and pervasive. Most previous research on automated negotiation has focused
on understanding and formalizing “successful” negotiations, i.e., negotiations
that do not become contentious to the point of impasse. This paper shifts the
emphasis to negotiations that are “difficult” to resolve and can hit an impasse. It
analyses a situation where two agents bargain over the division of the surplus of
several distinct issues to demonstrate how a procedure to avoid impasses can be
utilized in a specific negotiation setting. The procedure is based on the addition
of new issues to the agenda during the course of negotiation and the exploration
of the differences in the valuation of these issues to capitalize on Pareto optimal
agreements. This paper also lays the foundation for performing an experiment
to investigate how the evolution of negotiation contributes to the avoidance of
impasses, paying particular attention to the expansion of the number of issues to
be deliberated and its impact on the frequency of impasses.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is an important and pervasive form of social interaction − it may involve
two parties (bilateral negotiation) or more than two parties (multilateral negotiation),
and one issue (single-issue negotiation) or many issues (multi-issue negotiation). This
paper concentrates on two-party and multi-issue negotiation. We are interested in Pareto
optimal outcomes (because Pareto optimality ensures that resources are not wasted), the
uniqueness of these outcomes (because this allows agents to know their actual shares
of the issues under dispute), and the computational complexity of different negotiation
procedures and strategies (because agents should be able to negotiate in a reasonable
amount of time).
Negotiation is usually understood as proceeding through three distinct phases [6]:
a beginning or initiation phase, a middle or problem-solving phase, and an ending
or resolution phase. The initiation phase focuses on preparation and planning for
negotiation (usually referred to as pre-negotiation), and is marked by each party’s efforts
to posture for positions. The problem-solving phase focuses on movement toward a final
agreement (usually referred to as actual negotiation), and is characterized by strategic
maneuvers and jockeying for positions. The resolution phase focuses on elaborating
details and implementing the final agreement.
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Negotiation may end in an agreement, wherein the parties mutually agree to a
proposal, or in an impasse, wherein the parties do not reach a settlement. An impasse
(a stalemate or a deadlock) is a condition or state of negotiation in which there is
no apparent quick or easy resolution − the parties are unable to create mutually
advantageous deals that satisfy their aspirations [6]. Productive communication stops.
The issues are viewed is such a way that the parties do not believe that there is
any possible compatibility between them, or they cannot find a middle ground where
agreement is possible. The cost of a failed or faulty negotiation can be high in
many different ways (e.g., in the quantity of physical resources). Thus, effective
negotiators need to understand why negotiation breaks down and be familiar with
specific techniques to avoid or resolve impasses.
Artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have traditionally focused on understanding
and formalizing “successful” negotiations − most researchers have assumed
that negotiations result in agreement (see, e.g., [3,4,5]). Few researchers have
attempted to formalize “difficult” negotiations, i.e., negotiations that can become
contentious to the point of impasse (see, e.g., [2,7,12]). At present, despite these
and other relevant pieces of work, there is still a lack of theoretical and practical
understanding and important questions are still waiting to be addressed more
thoroughly. We highlight the following:
• Why and how negotiations become “difficult” to resolve and reach impasse? What
are the causes of impasse?
• How to manage “difficult” negotiations? Which are the actions that autonomous
agents can take jointly to return negotiations to a productive phase?
• Which individual approaches to impasse avoidance or resolution are effective?
This paper addresses some of these questions in a domain-independent way.
Recently, we have proposed a model that accounts for systematic preparation and
planning for negotiation, describes equilibrium strategies for the bargaining game of
alternating offers, and formalizes a procedure for assisting agents to avoid impasses [9].
The procedure involves the following main actions:
• re-definition of the agenda, i.e., addition of new issues to the agenda during the
course of negotiation;
• exploration of the differences in the valuation of the new issues to capitalize on
Pareto optimal agreements.
Taken together, these actions add an evolutionary dimension to negotiation − some
elements of the situation are not fixed, but evolve over time. Abandoning a static view
simply unveils new opportunities for mutually acceptable agreements.
In this paper, we analyse a situation where two agents bargain over the division
of the surplus of several distinct issues to demonstrate how the impasse avoidance
procedure can be utilized in a specific negotiation setting. We also lay the foundation for
performing an experiment to investigate how the evolution of negotiation contributes to
the avoidance of impasses, paying particular attention to the expansion of the number
of issues to be deliberated and its impact on the frequency of impasses.
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2 Pre-negotiation
Successful negotiators agree on one thing [6,13]: the keys to success in negotiation
are preparation and planning (pre-negotiation). Let Ag={ag1, ag2} be the set of
autonomous negotiating agents. Let Ii ={isi1, . . . , isiz} be the set of independent
issues of an agent agi ∈Ag. The issues are quantitative variables, defined over
continuous intervals. Negotiation usually involves a number of major or primary issues
(e.g., price) and several minor or secondary issues (e.g., maintenance policies). Let
MIi = {isi1, . . . , isin} and SIi = {isin+1, . . . , isiz} be the sets of major and minor
issues of agi, respectively. A brief description of various activities that negotiators make
efforts to perform in order to carefully prepare and plan for negotiation follows (see our
earlier work for an in-depth discussion [7,9]).
Effective pre-negotiation requires that negotiators prioritize the issues, define the
limits, and establish the agenda. Priorities are set by rank-ordering the issues, i.e., by
defining the most important, the second most important, and so on. The priority pril of
agi for each issue isil ∈Ii is a number that represents its order of preference. The weight
wil of isil is a number that represents its relative importance. The limit limil is the point
where agi decides that it should stop to negotiate, because any settlement beyond this
point is not minimally acceptable. The negotiating agenda is represented by Agenda
and specifies the final set of issues to be deliberated. Its definition involves interaction
with the opponent. Specifically, negotiators disclose and combine their individual sets
of major issues. For the sake of simplicity, we consider that the sets MIi and Agenda
contain the same issues.
Additionally, effective pre-negotiation requires that negotiators agree on an
appropriate protocol that defines the rules governing the interaction. The protocol can
be simple, allowing agents to exchange only proposals. Alternatively, the protocol
can be complex, allowing agents to provide arguments to support their negotiation
stance. However, most sophisticated protocols make considerable demands on any
implementation, mainly because they appeal to very rich representations of the agents
and their environments (see, e.g., [4]). Therefore, we consider an alternating offers
protocol [10]. Two agents or players bargain over the division of the surplus of n≥2
issues (goods or pies) by alternately proposing offers at times in T = {1, 2, . . .}. The
negotiation procedure, labelled the “joint-offer procedure”, involves bargaining over
the allocation of the entire endowment stream at once. An offer is a vector (x1, . . . , xn)
specifying a division of the n goods. Once an agreement is reached, the agreed-upon
allocations of the goods are implemented. This procedure permits agents to exploit the
benefits of trading concessions on different issues.
The players’ preferences are modelled by assuming that each player agi discounts
future payoffs at some given rate δti , 0<δti <1, (δti is referred to as the discount factor).
The cost of bargaining derives from the delay in consumption implied by a rejection of
an offer. Practically speaking, the justification for this form of preferences takes into
account the fact that money today can be used to make money tomorrow. Let Ui be the
payoff function of agi. For simplicity and tractability, we assume that Ui is separable in
all their arguments and that the per-period delay costs are the same for all issues:
Ui(x1, . . . , xn, t) = δ
(t−1)
i
∑n
l=1 wil uil(xl)
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where wil is the weight of isil and xl denotes the share of agi for isil. The component
payoff function uil for isil is a continuous, strictly monotonic, and linear function. The
distinguish feature of time preferences with a constant discount rate is the linearity of
the function uil [10]. The payoff of disagreement is normalized at 0 for both players.
Finally, effective pre-negotiation requires that negotiators be able to select an
appropriate strategy. Traditionally, AI researchers have paid little attention to this
pre-negotiation step. In the last several years, however, a number of researchers have
developed models that include libraries of negotiation strategies (see, e.g., [3,4,5]).
Some strategies are in equilibrium, meaning that no designer will benefit by building
agents that use any other strategies when it is known that some agents are using
equilibrium strategies (see, e.g., [10] for an in-depth description of the standard
game-theoretic concept of equilibrium). Thus, for some situations, the agents can be
designed to adopt equilibrium strategies and to negotiate according to these strategies.
This paper follows this line of work.
3 Actual Negotiation
The negotiation process is modelled as an extensive game. For convenience, we
consider the standard game-theoretic situation of two players completely informed
about the various aspects of the game. The players are assumed to be rational, and
each player knows that the other acts rationally. Also, we consider a particular setting
in which the players have different evaluations of the issues, as described below.
Two players are jointly endowed with a single unit of each of four goods,
{X1, . . . , X4}, and alternate proposals until they find an agreement. Each good is
modelled as an interval [0, 1] (or as a divisible pie of size 1). The players’ preferences
are as follows:
Ui = δ
(t−1)
i (a x1 + b x2 + x3 + x4)
Uj = δ
(t−1)
j [(1 − x1) + (1 − x2) + c (1 − x3) + d (1 − x4)]
where xl and (1 − xl), l=1, . . . , 4, denote the shares of agi and agj for each pie,
respectively. The parameters a, b, c, and d allow the marginal utilities of the players
to differ across issues and players. We consider a>b>1 and d>c>1, i.e., agi places
greater emphasis on goods X1 and X2 while agj values goods X3 and X4 more. Also,
we consider that δi and δj are close to 1 and the parameters a, b, c, and d are close to
one another. Let pt−1j→i and pti→j denote the offers that agj proposes to agi in period t−1
and agi proposes to agj in period t, respectively. Consider the following strategies:
str∗i =
{
offer (1, 1, x∗i3, 0) if agi’s turn
if Ui(pt−1j→i) ≥ U∗i accept else reject if agj’s turn
str∗j =
{
offer (1, x∗j2, 0, 0) if agj’s turn
if Uj(pti→j) ≥ U∗j accept else reject if agi’s turn
where U∗i =Ui(1, x∗j2, 0, 0), U∗j =Uj(1, 1, x∗i3, 0), and the shares
are the following: x∗i3 =
δiδj(a+b)−δj(a+b+bc+bd)+bc+bd
bc−δiδj and
x∗j2 =
δi(δiδj(a+b)−δj(a+b+bc+bd)+bc+bd)+(bc−δiδj)(aδi+bδi−a)
b(bc−δiδj) .
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Remark 1. For the two-sided four-issue bargaining game of alternating offers with an
infinite horizon, in which the players’ preferences are as described above, the pair of
strategies (str∗i , str∗j ) form an equilibrium. The outcome is the following:
x∗1 = 1, x
∗
2 = 1, x
∗
3 =
δiδj(a + b) − δj(a + b + bc + bd) + bc + bd
bc − δiδj , x
∗
4 = 0
Agreement is immediately reached with no delay. The outcome is Pareto optimal.
Letting δi →1 and δj →1, the equilibrium division is (1, 1, 0, 0).
The formal proof is based on the familiar necessary conditions for equilibrium: agi
is indifferent between waiting one period to have its offer accepted and accepting
agj’s offer immediately, and agj is indifferent between waiting one period to have
its offer accepted and accepting agi’s offer immediately. Let x∗i = (x∗i1, . . . , x∗i4) and
x∗j =(x
∗
j1, . . . , x
∗
j4) be the equilibrium proposals of agi and agj , respectively. The
problem for agi is to find an offer that maximizes its payoff (because it is a payoff
maximizer) subject to being acceptable to its opponent, i.e.,
maximize:
Ui(x1, . . . , x4, t) = δ
(t−1)
i (ax1 + bx2 + x3 + x4)
subject to:
(1−x∗i1)+(1−x∗i2)+c(1−x∗i3)+d(1−x∗i4) =
δj[(1−x∗j1)+(1−x∗j2)+c(1−x∗j3)+d(1−x∗j4)]
0 ≤ x∗il ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x∗jl ≤ 1, for l=1, . . . , 4
The problem for agj is stated in a similar way and is omitted. Solving both
maximization problems yields the outcome specified in the statement of the Remark. In
the limit, letting δi →1 and δj →1, the outcome of the equilibrium is (1, 1, 0, 0). This
outcome is on the Pareto frontier and corresponds to the utility pair (a+b, c+d).
4 Bargaining Impasse
Negotiators can adopt different orientations (and strategies) to accomplish their
goals. Two bargaining orientations are commonly discussed in the literature [11]:
individualistic or competitive and cooperative or problem solving. Individualistic
negotiators show a strong interest in achieving only their own outcomes − getting
this deal, winning this negotiation − and tend to pursue competitive strategies (e.g.,
appearing firm and imposing time pressure). Cooperative negotiators are concerned
with both their own and the other’s outcomes − building, preserving, or enhancing a
good relationship with the other party − and tend to pursue problem solving strategies
(e.g., logrolling and compensation).
The last section has considered a typical bargaining situation of two cooperative
agents and a “win-win” philosophy (formalized, at least in part, by the strategic choices
of the players). The agents were assumed to be sufficiently creative to devise the Pareto
frontier and able to settle for the outcome that maximizes their benefit (resources were
not wasted and money was not squandered).
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This section addresses a different bargaining situation − it considers a cooperative
agent, say agi, and a competitive agent, agj , who wants to “win” the negotiation. Now,
agj pursues a strategy compatible with its negotiating style (e.g., starting with high
demands and making a few small concessions throughout negotiation [7,8]). In period 1,
agi proposes the offer x∗i specified in Remark 1, and agj either accepts this offer or
rejects it. We restrict attention to the case in which agj rejects the offer x∗i . The play
passes to period 2 and agj proposes an offer yj , which agi rejects (considering that
Ui(yj , 2)<Ui(x∗i , 3)). The agents continue to negotiate in this manner and, therefore,
negotiation can become “difficult” to the point of impasse.
In this situation, agi can try to draw agj into a more constructive process.
Specifically, agi can manage the sets of major and minor issues constructively by
performing the following actions:
• analysis of the set SIi of minor issues; selection of issues that are believed to cost
less than they are worth to agj;
• addition of new issues to the set MIi of major issues (and subsequent re-definition
of the agenda);
• exploration of the differences in the valuation of the new issues.
The basic idea is to allow agi to prepare a new proposal that maximizes its benefit and
simultaneously is more favourable to agj (than any previous proposal). Taken together,
the suggested actions add an evolutionary dimension to the analysis. They can enable
the enlargement of the space of feasible settlements, thus facilitating movement towards
an optimal agreement.
Consider a new two-sided five-issue bargaining situation obtained from the two-sided
four-issue situation introduced in the previous section by changing the agenda, i.e., by
adding a new good X5. For the new bargaining game of alternating offers, time starts
at period 1. However, the players’ preferences take into account the costs of bargaining
derived from the delays in consumption implied by the rejection of offers in the “initial”
situation, i.e.,
Ui =δ
(t−1)+τ
i (a x1 + b x2 + x3 + x4) + δ
(t−1)
i x5
Uj =δ
(t−1)+τ
j [(1−x1)+(1−x2)+c (1−x3)+d (1−x4)]+δ(t−1)j e (1−x5)
where τ is a time period, a>b>1 and d>c> e>1. Consider the following strategies:
str∗∗i =
{
offer (1, 1, 0, 0, x∗∗i5 ) if agi’s turn
if Ui(pt−1j→i) ≥ U∗∗i accept else reject if agj’s turn
str∗∗j =
{
offer (1, x∗∗j2 , 0, 0, 0) if agj’s turn
if Uj(pti→j) ≥ U∗∗j accept else reject if agi’s turn
where U∗∗i = Ui(1, x∗∗j2 , 0, 0, 0), U∗∗j = Uj(1, 1, 0, 0, x∗∗i5 ),
x∗∗i5 =
(a+b)δτi δ
τ+1
j − (a+b+bc+bd)δτ−1i δτ+1j +(bc+bd)δτ−1i δτj − beδτ−1i (δj−1)
beδτ−1i − δτ+1j
, and
x∗∗j2 =
(abe+b2e)δτi − abeδτ−1i − (b+bc+bd)δτ+1j + (bc+bd)δτj − be(δj−1)
b(beδτ−1i − δτ+1j )
.
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Remark 2. For the new bilateral five-issue bargaining game of alternating offers with
an infinite horizon, in which the players’ preferences are as described above, the pair of
strategies (str∗∗i , str∗∗j ) form an equilibrium. The outcome is Pareto optimal:
x∗∗1 = 1, x
∗∗
2 = 1, x
∗∗
3 = 0, x
∗∗
4 = 0,
x∗∗5 =
(a+b)δτi δ
τ+1
j −(a+b+bc+bd)δτ−1i δτ+1j +(bc+bd)δτ−1i δτj−beδτ−1i (δj−1)
beδτ−1i − δτ+1j
Agreement is immediately reached with no delay. Letting δi →1 and δj →1, the
equilibrium division is (1, 1, 0, 0, 0).
The formal proof is similar to the proof of Remark 1. At this stage, it is worth noting
that the offer specified in Remark 2 is more favourable to agj than the offer specified in
Remark 1. Thus, this new offer can be accepted, i.e., the negotiation process may end
successfully and the Pareto optimal agreement may be implemented.
Example 1. Consider a sales agent and a logistics agent operating in a multi-agent
supply chain system. The sales agent is responsible for acquiring orders from
customers, negotiating with customers, and handling customer requests for modifying
or canceling orders. The logistics agent is responsible for coordinating the plants and
distribution centers of a manufacturing enterprise − it manages the movement of
materials and products across the supply chain, from the suppliers of raw materials
to the customers of finished goods. In particular, consider the following situation:
“David, the director of Sales, is trying to arrange for production of its two new orders,
one for 10000 and the other for 5000 men’s suits. Martin, the director of Logistics, is
stating that the job will take four months. Together, they will gross over 25000 Euros,
with a fine profit for the company. The problem is that Martin insists that the job will
take four months and David’s customer wants a two-month turnaround. Also, David
claims that it can’t afford to lose the customer”.
There are four major issues of concern in negotiation, namely quantity 1 and date 1
(for the 10000 suit order), and quantity 2 and date 2 (for the 5000 suit order). The sales
agent places greater emphasis on quantity 1 and date 1 (due to the inherent customer
demands). On the other hand, the logistics agent values quantity 2 and date 2 more.
Figure 1 shows the joint utility space for the agents (the small squares represent a few
possible agreements). The Pareto frontier is represented by the dotted line OAO’ and
the optimal outcome referred to in Remark 1 by the point A. This outcome provides a
(normalized) benefit of 0.65 to each party (letting δi →1 and δj →1).
Additionally, there is one minor issue for the sales agent: meeting attendance, i.e.,
the right to attend a number of Sales Division meetings that are of interest to the
Logistics Division. The inclusion of this issue unveils new opportunities for mutually
acceptable agreements, thus changing the location of the Pareto frontier. Figure 1
shows the new location of the frontier (line OBO’). The optimal outcome referred
to in Remark 2 is represented by the point B and provides a (normalized) benefit of
0.725 to Martin and 0.55 to David (again, letting δi →1 and δj →1). Thus, Martin may
re-analyze the negotiation situation, adopt a different negotiating style, and respond
favourably to this new solution.
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Fig. 1. Joint utility space for the sales and logistics agents
5 Experimental Analysis: Preliminary Report
The analytic results just given ensure the benefits of adding new issues to the agenda for
the negotiation setting discussed here. However, the theory does not articulate how fast
the convergence of negotiation is. Specifically, negotiation may become contentious
to the point of impasse, even if the agents are sufficiently creative to re-define the
agenda and exploit the differences in the valuation of the new issues to capitalize on
Pareto optimal agreements. We intend to address this issue by empirically investigating
how the evolution of negotiation contributes to the avoidance of impasses, paying
particular attention to the expansion of the number of issues to be deliberated and its
impact on the frequency of impasses. Accordingly, we describe below the experimental
method, discuss the independent and dependent variables, and introduce the preliminary
hypotheses. In so doing, we lay the foundation for the experimental work.
The experimental method is controlled experimentation [1]. The experiment involves
three types of agents: (i) competitive agents, (ii) creative agents, and (iii) impasse
avoidance agents. Competitive agents are individualistically oriented and pursue a
strategy str. This strategy models an optimistic opening attitude and successive small
concessions [7,8]. Creative agents are cooperatively oriented and pursue a strategy str∗
(see Remark 1). Impasse avoidance agents are also cooperatively oriented and pursue a
strategy str∗ at the beginning of negotiation and a strategy str∗∗ after the rejection of
the first offer (see Remark 2).
Research on human negotiation has shown that motivational orientation (and
strategy) affects both process and outcome in bilateral interaction (see, e.g., [11,13]).
A cooperative orientation has increased the joint benefit of negotiators. Also, when
aspirations were high and inflexible, negotiations were more likely to be broken off
under an individualistic as opposed to a cooperative orientation. Accordingly, the
hypotheses are as follows (a dyad is composed by a sales agent and a logistics agent):
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Hypothesis 1. Dyads whose sales agent is cooperatively oriented (cooperatively oriented
dyads) will reach higher quality outcomes (higher joint benefits) than dyads whose sales
agent is individualistic oriented (individualistic oriented dyads).
Hypothesis 2. The impasse rate will be lower in cooperatively oriented dyads than in
individualistic oriented dyads. The impasse rate will be lowest in cooperatively oriented
dyads composed by an impasse avoidance sales agent.
Hypothesis 3. The cost of bargaining (the time spent in negotiation) will be lower in
cooperatively oriented dyads composed by an impasse avoidance sales agents than in
cooperatively oriented dyads composed by a creative sales agent.
The independent variable is the bargaining orientation of the sales agent (manipulated by
assigning a specific strategy to this agent). This variable has three levels, namely the three
strategies mentioned earlier. The dependent variables are the impasse rate, the time spent
in negotiation, the Pareto efficiency, and the joint benefit provided by the final agreement.
The first dependent variable is the impasse rate, i.e., the frequency of impasses. The
second variable is the time spent in negotiation (measured in terms of the total number
of offers exchanged by the agents). The next variable is the Pareto efficiency, i.e., the
extent to which an agreement approaches the frontier (a fully Pareto efficient agreement
is Pareto optimal). The last dependent variable is the joint benefit provided by the final
agreement, i.e., the sum of the two agents’ benefits in the final agreement.
The experiment involves three groups of trials. Each group corresponds to a level of
the independent variable. A trial is a single run of the experimental system and involves
a bargaining session. Trials of the same group will, in general, differ from one another.
The detailed experimental procedure is a follows:
• for each group of trials, the experimenter manipulates the independent variable,
i.e., assigns a strategy to the sales agent;
• for each trial in each group, the experimenter randomly determines the agent that
starts the bidding process and the orientation of the logistics agent, i.e., its strategy
(from a library containing competitive and problem solving strategies [7,8]);
• for all trials of each group, the experimenter measures the dependent variables and
computes averages on the measures taken.
6 Related Work
Traditionally, AI researchers have focused on modelling “successful” negotiations, i.e.,
negotiations that result in agreement (see, e.g., [3,4,5]). There are, however, some
researchers that have studied various techniques that autonomous agents can use to
resolve impasses on their own (see, e.g., [2,7,12]). Faratin [2], for example, presented
a model that incorporates a mechanism to assist agents in dynamically including or
retracting issues from the set of negotiation issues. The author acknowledged the
usefulness of the mechanism to escape negotiation deadlocks. However, he pointed out
that the mechanism is complex and deferred to future work both its specification and its
empirical analysis. Lopes et al. [7] developed a model that formalizes a structure for the
problem under negotiation and supports the dynamic change of that structure to achieve
movement towards agreement (problem restructuring). The authors pointed out that
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problem restructuring facilitates the resolution of impasses. However, they observed
that problem restructuring is a highly creative and challenging task and postponed
its formal treatment to future work. Sycara [12] developed the Persuader system for
resolving conflicts in the domain of labor relations. Problem restructuring may take
place during the modification of a proposal.
At present, despite these and other relevant pieces of work, the study of negotiations
that are “difficult” to resolve, the formalization of approaches to impasse avoidance,
and the empirical evaluation of agents capable of managing “difficult” negotiations are
still in its infancy. This paper has addressed these issues in a specific negotiation setting.
7 Conclusion
This paper has shifted the emphasis to negotiations that are “difficult” to resolve and
can hit an impasse. It has analysed a particular situation where two agents bargain over
the division of the surplus of several distinct issues and has demonstrated the benefits
of an impasse avoidance procedure involving the re-definition of the agenda during the
course of negotiation. It has also laid the foundation for performing an experiment to
investigate how the evolution of negotiation contributes to the avoidance of impasses.
Autonomous agents able to negotiate and avoid impasses under complete
information are currently being developed using the Jade framework. Our aim for the
future is to perform a set of experiments to validate the key components of the agents.
In addition, we intend to develop more sophisticated agents that are able to negotiate
and avoid impasses under incomplete information.
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